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Stefani G. , Giudicissi E.  
 
Abstract 
We  reviewed  some  moral  hazard  (MH)  models  applied  to  agri-environmental  policies  and 
identified  the  main  methodological  aspects  of  the  literature  on  this  topics.  Imperfect  vs 
incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main 
lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. 
Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that 
the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement 
strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and 
urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Cross compliance (CC) was first introduced in the USA in the '70s when provisions for 
soil and wetlands protection were linked to participation in commodity programs. In the EU 
CAP some form of CC dates back to the McSharry reform in 1992. However, it is only with the 
2003 Mid Term Review that cross compliance became a fully mandatory measure applied to all 
direct payments. Current debate about the post 2013 CAP suggests an even wider role for CC 
mechanisms. A group of agricultural economists recently advocated a shift in agricultural policy 
from market intervention and income support to public good provision (ReformtheCAP, 2009). 
Even if the Commission will not hold such a radical position it is likely that some further 
greening of the PAC and a wider application of CC is going to take place in the future in order 
to justify the large share of the EU budget that still accrues to the agricultural sector.  
In the European Union, CC is currently a form of regulation relying on process standards 
that mainly address environmental or health externalities. As any other form of regulation CC 
comprises three stages: enactment of legislation; setting up of regulatory administrations and 
rules; enforcement of the rules. Although the third stage is “as vital for the success of regulation 
as  the  first  two”  (Baldwin  and  Cave,  1999,  p.96)  a  large  share  of  economic  analysis  of 
environmental policies deals with efficiency and distributional issues related to the first two 
stages (Cohen, 1999). The objective of this study is -instead- to review research progress in 
Agricultural  Economics  in  the  area  of  implementation  and  enforcement  of  CC  rules.  In 
particular, we discuss the practical relevance of this literature for current and foreseeable CC 
policies in EU. 
We reviewed material mainly from economic journals referenced in CAB and Econlit. 
The  material  included  research  on  micro-economic  models  on  incentives,  penalties  and 
monitoring that influence compliance. As CC standards are deeply intertwined with those of Ancona - 122
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agri-environmental schemes (AES) the review embraces papers that address the second topic 
whenever the focus is on implementation. On the contrary, papers that focus exclusively on 
efficiency or efficacy of policy measures (such as those that adopt a cost-benefit approach or 
those addressing monetary valuation of benefits) are not covered. Similarly, distributional issues 
are not dealt with. Overall, the review covers a dozen of articles that are broadly organised 
according to methodological features. The paper is set out as follow: in the second section the 
main models of enforcement of agri-environmental policies are illustrated and key elements are 
identified. The reviewed literature is compared with respect to each aspect of the models. In the 
third  section the relevance  of  the  literature  for  actual  CC  policies  is discussed. The  fourth 
section concludes. 
2.  PRINCIPAL AGENT MODELS  
The major area of the microeconomic literature on CC and agri-environmental schemes 
comprises mostly normative studies on the contractual mechanisms put in place to overcome 
informational  asymmetries  between  a  principal  (the  regulator  agency)  and  agents  such  as 
farmers. Papers in this area can be classified according to the categories of adverse selection 
(AS) and moral hazard (MH).  
The AS literature covers issues mainly related to the design of contracts whereby the 
principal  can  discriminate  between  agents  with  different  costs  of  compliance  that  are  only 
imperfectly  known  by  the  principal  (hereafter:  “regulator”).  Acquisition  of  information  on 
observable farmer characteristics that are correlated with compliance costs, screening contracts 
and procurement auctions are the main approaches to the problem (e.g. Ferraro 2008 ). This 
literature is relevant for AES where fund allocation can be improved by alternative contractual 
mechanisms. However, direct payments linked to CC are not settable according to costs of 
compliance or value of produced benefits because of their income support nature. In the CC 
case, the major issues appear to be just monitoring and punishment not contract design (Latacz 
Lohmann, 1999).  
In a MH model the the regulator cannot observe perfectly and costlessly farmer behaviour 
after a contract has been signed. Monitoring is imperfect or incomplete and the information 
asymmetry  provides  incentives  for  farmers  to  cheat  and  do  not  comply  with  contractual 
obligations. Whenever not detected cheaters can receive a compensation payment (the single 
farm payment in the case of CC) without bearing any cost of compliance. 
Several principal-agent models have been proposed to deal with these aspects, mainly 
relating to MH or both MH and AS. Different features of the mechanism design have been 
investigated  such  as:  type  of  monitoring  uncertainty,  single  farm  type  vs  heterogeneity  of 
farmers,  type  of  compliance  (continuum  as  in  the  case  of  input  quotas  or  discrete  as  in 
regulations mandating certain practices), temporal pattern of decision (one shot vs dynamic 
models), type of regulator objective (budget minimisation, welfare maximization), risk attitude 
of farmers . Figure 1 sketches a tentative classification of the reviewed studies according to 
some of the above criteria. Ancona - 122
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Figure 1. MH models of agri-environmental schemes 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Despite  of  differences,  almost  all  MH  models  of  Agri-environmental  schemes  are 
composed of the same set of elements:  
·  a behavioural model of the farmer usually portrayed as an expected utility maximiser 
·  the regulator objective function  
·  hypothesis on the availability of information and distribution of uncertainty 
·  model  constraints:  participation  constrains  making  the  scheme  attractive  for  farmers 
complying with regulation and incentive compatibility constraints which make farmer 
prefer complying to cheating and non complying. 
·  a set of policy variables such as: monitoring level and cost, fines, compliance rewards and 
incentives levels 
·  policy suggestions stemming from model solution Ancona - 122
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The remaining of the section is devoted to a comparison of the models for each of the 
above  elements.  Comparability  across  models  should  be  enhanced  as  within  each  element 
similarities and dissimilarities are more easily detected. Whenever possible, we tried to adopt an 
uniform notation. 
2.1.  Behavioural model of farmers 
Farmers are usually modelled as expected utility maximisers. Some papers assume risk 
neutral agents (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005, Latacz Lohmann, 1998, 1999; White, 2002). 
As it is well know from Becker (1968) incentive schemes for risk neutral agents can freely 
substitute  costly  monitoring  with  arbitrary  high  fines  to  induce  compliance.  Compliance  is 
observed whenever cost of compliance ci are equal or lower than the expected costs from fines 
(F) : 
* i c p F £                            1)  
where p is the probability of detection or frequency of monitoring.  
When partial compliance is allowed, as in continuum compliance models of an input 
quota xi, an alternative to fixed fines is provided by variable fines proportional to the over-quota 
use of a polluting input :  i i F x x j  = -  
 
∼
. The problem of the agent is to choose a level of input 
that minimise compliance costs minus expected fines. Under standard assumptions, compliance 
is observed up to the level where: 
' * ' i i i i c x p x x j     £    
   
∼ ∼
                    1b)  
that is, farmers choose that level of input that equals marginal costs of compliance and 
marginal expected fines (Heyes, 1996). 
Being monitor costly, an optimal solution would be to fix fines at the highest possible 
levels  adjusting  p  in  order  to  satisfy 
1.  However,  fine  levels  for  agri-environmental  or  CC 
infringements cannot be much higher than participation incentives or direct payments due to 
legislative constraints. Moreover, even if high fines were feasible, a deterrence trap (Hogus, 
1994, p.92) is likely to arise due to the limited ability of small and medium farmers to pay 
draconian sanctions because of wealth constraints.  
Most authors cite empirical research reporting high rates of compliance among farmers 
despite low incentives . Indeed, high rates of environmental compliance have been found also in 
other industrial sectors giving rise to the so called Harrington paradox (Heyes, 1998). Both risk 
aversion and honesty are possible candidate to explain why in a context of relatively low fines 
                                                      
 
 
1 In case of variable fine it would be sufficient to set a fine structure so that (jx) be sufficiently steep. 
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and detection probabilities high rates of compliance are observed among farmers. In the first 
case risk aversion makes, ceteris paribus, the compliance game less attractive with respect to 
the  sure  outcome  from  compliance.  In  the  second  case  voluntary  compliance  is  driven  by 
attitudes and values. Hart and Latacz Lohman (2005) model of farm compliance relies upon a 
percentage of farmers being driven by honesty in constrast to self interest.  
It  remains  an  open  question  whether  risk  aversion  is  actually  so  widespread  among 
farmers. Ozanne and White (2008) support the view that the evidence of risk aversion is strong 
enough  while  according  to  Hart  and  Latacz  Lomanh  (2005)  empirical  studies  show  mixed 
results. However, most authors model risk averse agents. Fraser (2001, 2002) and Yano and 
Blandford (2009) adopt a mean variance framework, Choe and Fraser (1998, 1999) a concave 
ad hoc specification for the utility function. Another popular way to model risk aversion, at least 
for numerical simulation purposes, is given by a power utility function with Arrow-Pratt relative 
risk aversion measureing the attitude toward risk (Fraser, 2002; Yano and Blandford, 2009; 
Ozanne,Hogan and White, 2001; Ozanne and White, 2008): 
( ) u
q p p
- =   with   ( ) 1 AP R x q + =                        2) 
where RAP is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion measure. 
2.2.  Regulator's objective functions 
MH models of monitoring and punishment aim at designing environmental schemes that 
either maximise a social welfare function (most of the reviewed studies) or minimize public 
scheme  costs  for  given  environmental  benefits  (Latcz  Lohmann,  1998;  Hart  and  Latcz 
Lohmann, 2005) or simply reduce the amount of moral hazard (Fraser, 2002; Fraser, 2004; 
Yano  and  Blandford,  2009).  Social  welfare  functions  include  monetary  valuations  of 
environmental benefits, producer surplus, transfer payments and transaction costs borne by the 
authority administering the scheme (possibly net of fines). The following example, referring to a 
model applied to a polluting input quota, is drawn from Ozanne and White (2007, 2008) : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 i i i i i i i z V x x b c x e b M p = - + - - - +                    3) 
where zi is the social welfare contribution of the i
th farmer and xi
* is the profit maximising 
input quantity. V(x) is a value of abatement function with the usual properties, b is the transfer 
payment offered by  the  scheme  and c  is the  cost of  compliance  function defined  as profit 
foregone, that is ( ) ( )
*
i i i c x x p p = - . The last term on the right side are the administrative and 
transactional costs of the scheme: transfer or payment b and monitoring costs M which are 
function of the monitoring frequency p. Both costs are pre-multiplied by (1+e) where e is the 
shadow cost of public funds. If required, risk aversion is introduced replacing the second term 
on the r.h.s. with a utility function having the same argument,  ( ) ( ) i i i w b c x - . Hereafter, we 
will refer to the risk neutral case for the sake of maintaining formulas more readable . Whenever Ancona - 122
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a producer payoff appears in the formulas risk aversion can be easily introduced by replacing it 
with an appropriate utility function. 
In Yano and Blandford (2009) payments are modelled as a share g of compliance costs 
( ) i i b yc = . Ozanne and White (2007, 2008) consider a continuum of compliance decisions 
whereby  farmers  can  decide  to  partially  complying  by  using  input  quantity  i x
∼
  (with 
i i i x x x > >
∼
). Fines for non compliance are modelled as proportional to input above the quota 
level as in (1b):  , x x x x j h     = -    
   
∼ ∼
. Ozanne and White (2008) rewrite producer surplus as 
i i i i i i b c x p x x h
      - - -        
∼ ∼
,which is the expected return from the compliance gamble. In their 
paper  the  administrative  costs  are  calculated  net  of  expected  fines  as 
( ) i i i i b M p p x x h
 




. Minor modifications of the social welfare function are required to 
account for an input charge rather than an input quota scheme as illustrated in Ozanne(2002)
2.  
Finally, monitoring costs have been modelled as fixed, linearly dependent on p or as a 
polynomial of degree 2 in p. 
Another version of the objective function is proposed by Choe and Fraser (1998, 1999) 
that consider only two level of input reduction: high (x
*-xh) and low (x
*-xl) with payments bh 
and bl respectively. Producer surplus does not contribute to regulator's objective. The authors 
hypothesise imperfect monitoring whereby all farmers are monitored but detection of high or 
low effort is subject to a level of accuracy q. Effort is perfectly identified when q is equal to 1, it 
is  randomly  detected  for  q  equal  to  0.5.  As  monitoring  is  imperfect,  each  level  of  input 
reduction implies transfer payments given by a weighted average of bh and bl where weights are 
given by q and (1-q). Monitoring cost are proportional to accuracy : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
, , , , 1 0.5 h l i h l h l h l z V x x qb q b q m = - - + - - -                4) 
Fraser (2001) applies a MH model to the problem of slippage in the context of a set-aside 
policy. In its objective function (which is not explicitly maximised) benefits are given by saving 
of export subsidies arising from decreases in production when good land instead of bad land is 
                                                      
 
 
2 In this case x and c(x) are both function of t, the input charge, while F is replaced by τ(t) the revenue from input taxation. Ozanne 
and White (2007) show that, under asymmetric information, input quotas and input charges are equivalent instruments and lead to 
the same outcomes for the MH model. 
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set aside. V(x) is thus replaced by ( ) EU w p p - , the gap between EU and world prices, times the 
difference between good and bad land yields. In this case transfer payments b are equal to a set 
aside premium for unit of yield (s) times the extra reference yield -with respect to the actual 
reference yield level- needed to induce setting aside of good land  ( ) g a r r - . Monitoring costs 
are assumed as fixed while producer surplus is not accounted for: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) i EU w b b g b z p p y y s r r M = - - - - +                  5)  
Differently from the above models, Latacz Lohman (1998) and Hart and Latacz Lohman 
(2005)  assume  a  regulator  whose  objective  is  to  minimise  budgetary  expenses  for  a 
predetermined  compliance  target  (in term of percentage  of  complying  farmers) that acts  as 
constraint  to  the  optimization  problem.  The  model  is  a  multi-agent  one  that  accounts  for 
heterogeneous  agents  with  different  costs  of  compliance.  If  (NC+NNC)  is  the  number  of 
complying farmer and non complying farmer that participate in the scheme then the objective 
function of the regulator is to minimise: 
( ) ( ) ( ) C NC NC C NC TC b N N pN b F mp N N = + - + + +                 6)  
subject  to  the  constrain  that  at  least  M  farmers  will  participate  and  comply.  Farmer 
participation is determined by the payoff of either cheating or complaying being greater than 
zero, an occurrence that depends on policy variables such as p, b and F but also on the cost of 
compliance of single farmers. If a farmer is caught cheating the transfer payment is completely 
withdrawn and a supplementary fine is applied. 
2.3.  Hypothesis on the availability of information and distribution of uncertainty 
The  above  regulator  problems  are  all  set  within  an  asymmetric  information  context. 
Indeed,  farmers  can  respond  to  agri-environmental  schemes  either  a)  participating  and 
complying or b) participating and non complying (cheating or compliance gamble) or c) opting 
out (Latacz Lohmann, 1998). To overcome information asymmetries, regulators have to monitor 
farmer  behaviour.  With  perfect  monitoring  all  farmers  are  monitored  thus  leading  to  sure 
detection and disincentive of cheating but at a cost. Incomplete monitoring occurs when the 
probability of being monitored is positive but lower than unity. Instead, imperfect monitoring 
refers to the partial accuracy of monitoring as in the Choe and Fraser (1998) model. 
From  the  farmer  point  of  view  uncertainty  affects  payoff:  a)  when  monitoring  is 
incomplete and the chosen action is non compliance ; b) always, when monitoring is imperfect. 
Because of incomplete or imperfect monitoring the payoffs of farmers are uncertain as those of 
a lottery (or a gamble). Output price and subsequent profit variability are introduced as further 
source of uncertainty by some models (Fraser, 2001, 2002; Yano and Blandford, 2009). 
Besides imperfectly observed behaviour of agents, information affects regulator options 
also in other ways. Models from the literature assume that the regulator may or may not have Ancona - 122
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information about other relevant elements such as: production technology, cost of compliance, 
risk  attitude  of  farmers,  honesty  of  farmers.  Table  1  below  show  the  assumptions  about 
information available to regulators brought about by the reviewed papers. 










Risk attitude  Honesty  Output price 
Hart Latacz Lohmann(2005) 
Latacz Lohman (1998)  n.a.  n.a.  distribution  n.a.  distribution  n.a. 
Fraser (2001), (2002)  n.a.  yes  depends on 
output price  yes  n.a.  distribution 
Fraser (2004)  n.a.  n.a.  yes  yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Yano and Blandford* (2009)  n.a.  distribution   distribution  yes  n.a.  distribution 
Choe and Fraser (1998)(1999) yes  n.a.  yes   yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Ozanne et al. (2001)  yes  yes  yes  yes  n.a.  n.a. 
White (2002)**  yes  yes  yes  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Ozanne and White 
(2007)(2008)**  yes  yes  yes  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: own elaboration. n.a.=not applicable. *Production technology refers to private benefit. ** We consider only 
the moral hazard model. In the combined moral hazard adverse selection model the regulator has priors on farm type. 
 
In the table only MH models are considered. Actually, White (2002) and Ozanne and 
White (2007; 2008) propose also MH-AS combined models where the regulator has priors about 
production technology and cost of compliance types of farmers and can offer differentiated 
contracts. This is a different assumption with respect to those by Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 
(1988) where the regulator knows the distribution of cost of compliance among farmers but 
offer a single contract focussing on MH issues. It is worth noticing that the less demanding is 
the model in terms on information, the more is the model applicable to large schemes such as 
EU  cross  compliance  where,  for  example,  detailed  information  on  issues  such  as  benefit 
functions may be costly to collect (Latacz-Lohmann, 1999). 
2.4.  Model constraints 
Constraints  on  desired  farmer  behaviour  are  a  key  feature  of  MH  models  that 
characterizes  the  optimization  problem  or  simply  defines  the  conditions  for  compliance. 
Participation or individual rationality (IR) constraint must be fulfilled if the farmer has to enter 
an  agri-environmental  scheme.  It  prescribes  that  the  utility  from  entering  the  scheme  and 
complying be equal or larger than the utility of opting out (reservation utility). For a risk neutral 
agent: 
IR: ( ) 0 i i b c - ³                           7) 
or in the continuum compliance model: Ancona - 122
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IR:  0 i i i i i i b c x p x x h
        - + - ³            
∼ ∼
                      8) 
In  the  imperfect  monitoring  case  (Choe  and  Fraser,  1998  and  1999)  the  constraint 
modifies in: 
IR:  ( ) ( ) , , , 1 0 h l h l h l qb q b c + - - ³                                 9) 
since  the  incentive  for  a  participating  farmer  is  subject  to  uncertainty  because  of 
inaccuracy in monitoring. 
Fraser (2001,2002), although not explicitly, sets the IR constraint so that setting aside the 
good land is worthwhile: 
IR:  ( ) ( ) 0 g b g b s r r p y y - - - ³                              10) 
where the first term is the increase in payment arising from setting aside good instead of 
bad land (analogue to b of equation 7) and the second term is the foregone income (expected 
price times the difference in yield between good and bad land). 
A  different  perspective  is  adopted  by  Latacz  Lohmann  (1998)  and  Hart  and  Latacz 
Lohmann (2005). In their multi-agent model farmers participate in the scheme if either payoff 
from cheating or payoff from complying are larger than zero. Payoff from cheating and non 
complying is positive when
3: 






>   -  
                     11) 
which  is  a  condition that is  completely  controlled by the  regulator.  On  the  contrary, 
Payoff from complying - given by equation (7) - depends on the distribution f(ci) of cost of 
compliance across the population of farmers. 
The  other  constraint  considered  in  MH  models  of  monitoring  is  the  incentive 
compatibility (IC) one which assures that compliance is preferred to non compliance. In the 
simplest  case  and  for  a  risk  neutral  agents  (Ozanne,  2001)  the  IC  states  that  payoff  from 
complying must be larger than the expected payoff from non complying and being fined F with 
probability p: 
IC:  ( ) ( ) 1 i i i i i b c x p b p F - ³ - -                      12) 
which in the continuum compliance case (Ozanne and White, 2008) becomes : 
                                                      
 
 
3According to the model, in case of detection of non compliance the payment is withdrawn and a supplementary fine is applied. 
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IC:  i i i i i i i i i i b c x p x x b c x p x x h h
» »             - - - ³ - - -                        
∼ ∼
             13) 
In this framework incentive compatibility requires that farmers prefer non compliance at 
input level  i x
∼




. Noticeably, this leads to the same 
results as (1b). That is, marginal cost of compliance must be lower or equal than the expected 
increase in penalty for one unit more of input in excess of the quota. Note also that when the 
riskiness of complying vs non complying is the same and risk aversion is no longer an issue in 
designing optimal schemes. 
In  the  imperfect  monitoring  case  (Choe  and  Fraser,  1998  and  1999)  the  constraint 
modifies in: 
IC:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 h l h l h l qb q b c qb q b c + - - ³ + - -                  14)  
when regulator seeks to implement the high input reduction scheme. A similar formula 
applies for the low input case with pedices inverted. 
Fraser (2001,2002) constraint states that the payoff from truthfully setting aside good land 
and declaring so must be greater than the expected payoff from cheating : 
IC:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g b g b g b g s r r p y y s r r p sr d - - - ³ - -                  15)  
where the r.h.s. is given by the increase in the premium gained by declaring to set aside 
good instead of bad land to which is subtracted the expected fine that the farmer has to pay if 
caught cheating (a proportion of  d the set-aside premium srg times the probability of being 
detected p). 
Fraser  (2004)  proposes  a  dynamic  two  period  model  of  MH  with  state  dependent 
monitoring. The probability of detection rises in the second period for those farmers that are 
caught  cheating  in the  first period  and  assigned  to  a  target  group. This  is  quite  a realistic 
assumption at least for schemes such as EU cross compliance. In the absence of targeting, the 
IC states the conditions under which behaving always truthfully is preferred to cheating in both 
periods, since the mixed strategies (cheating in period 1 and behaving truthfully in period 2 or 
the other way round) are always dominated: 
IC: ( ) ( )







b c p b pF
b c p b pF
r r
- - -
- + ³ - - +
+ +
               16) 
If targeting is put in place the target group in the second period will be monitored with 
frequency pH>p. However, farmers that would cheat with the previous probability of detection p 
will not be prevented to continue to cheat in the second period as the following will hold 
whenever (16) does hold: Ancona - 122
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( ) ( )





i i i i
b c p b pF
b c b c
r r
- - -
- + ³ - +
+ +
                17)  
Furthermore, a resource neutral approach - whereby resources for additional monitoring 
in the target group are obtained by lowering monitoring frequency (pL< p) of the remaining 
farmers- is likely to cause further shortfalls. Now even those that previously behaved truthfully 
in both periods may be tempted to switch to the mixed strategy because of the lower monitoring 
intensity in the non targeted group. To overcame this shortfall Fraser (2004) proposes to rely on 
farmer risk aversion by increasing the riskiness of cheating among those in the non target group 
through an appropriate mean-penalty preserving adjustment in pL and F. Model results appear to 
somewhat depend on the two period nature of the game. Infinitely repeated games may lead to 
more cost-effective solutions as the incentive to non comply in the last period disappear as it is 
illustrated by Heyes (2000)
4. 
According to Latacz Lohmann (1998) and Hart and Latacz Lohmann (2005) a farmer 
comply if: 
( ) ( ) 1 i b c x p b pF - ³ - -  or  ( ) i c p b F £ +                   18) 
When cost of compliance is distributed across farmers with density function f(c) -or a 
distribution function F(c) - the share of compliant farmers is given by: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) c
p b F
dc p b F f
+
= F + ∫ Φ                    19) 
A similar multi agent setting can be found in Yuno and Blandford (2009). According to 
their model, the regulator can contrast cheating with compliance rewards (R) in addition to 
fines. Risk neutral farmers will comply if the expected payoff from complying is greater than 
the one from cheating: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 i b c x pR p b pF - + ³ - -  or  ( ) i c p b R F £ + +                20) 
where the payoff from complying on the r.h.s. is given by the payment net of compliance 
costs plus the expected compliance reward. The share of complying farmer is found as in the 
Latacz Lohman model. If an additional amount T of funds per farmer is available then the 
regulator may decide to increase the monitoring intensity or to spend the amount on compliance 





= +                            20) 
                                                      
 
 
4 Another dynamic model has been proposed by White (2005) but in a context of ecological monitoring where MH is not an issue. 
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where  cost  of  monitoring  is  assumed  equal  to  mp.  In  the  second  case  the  expected 





=                           21) 
where  i a  is the expected ex ante compliance rate. By substituting the new value for p in 
equation  (18)  and  then  for  R  in  equation  (19)  the  authors  find  that  spending  money  on 







> +                   22) 
If we conservatively assume that the ex ante compliance rate is close to one, compliance 
rewards is the preferred option when the loss borne by the detected cheater is smaller than the 
cost of monitoring. Although monitoring is costly this appear to be a rather restrictive condition 
at least for schemes such as EU cross compliance. 
When IR and IC constraints are part of an explicit social welfare maximisation problem ( 
as in Ozanne et al. 2001; Ozanne and White, 2007, 2008; White, 2002) one important aspect is 
whether they are binding or not. Ozanne et al. (2001) state that both constraints are binding 
because of the positive shadow value of public funds (e) and marginal costs of monitoring 
(M'(p)).  However,  a causal  inspection of the numerical  simulation provided by  the  authors 
reveals that only the IC constraint is binding. At the solution, transfer payments exceed costs of 
compliance and farmers are gaining a positive rent from participating in the scheme. An higher 
b may be necessary to satisfy the IC at minimum cost when monitoring is costly. 
Multi-agent models that are framed as a cost minimisation problem for a given target 
compliance rate allow for IC constraints to be violated at the solution by some participating 
farmers. Conversely, welfare maximising models with compliance cost heterogeneity (such as 
White,  2002)  lead  to  corner  solutions  where  the  monitoring  rate  are  set  so  high  that  all 
participating  farmer  are  complying  when  a  pooling  solution  is  adopted  (Hart  and  Latacz 
Lohmann, 2005). 
2.5.  Policy variables 
All MH models with monitoring define three sets of variables: a) choice variables; b) 
policy parameters, c) endogenous parameters. Often the distinction between the first two set of 
variable is driven by convenience only: both types of variable are enforcing instruments that the 
regulator can change. For example in Ozanne et al. (2001) fines are a policy parameter since 
they are maintained fixed (or predetermined) and the social welfare function is maximised w.r.t. 
other choice variables: restricted input level (x) , transfer payment (b) and monitoring frequency 
(p). Conversely, endogenous parameters refer to economic aspects (such as technology, costs, Ancona - 122
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benefit functions) or behavioural properties (risk aversion, honesty) that are not modifiable by 
the regulator. The models we reviewed differ to some extent as for their assumptions about 
variables and policy parameters as it is shown by table 2.  
Fines (F) are never modelled as choice variables because of the legislative, administrative 
and  wealth  constraints  that  prevent  regulators  to  rise  fines  beyond  certain  levels.  Transfer 
payments and intensity of monitoring are always choice variables or parameter in those model 
that are not based on explicit optimization. According to the literature these are the key policy 
instruments of agri-environmental schemes. Those (Ozanne et al. 2001, Ozanne and White, 
2007, 2008) who model the compliance choice in the continuum, considers as choice variable 
also the level of input quotas or, alternatively of input charges (Ozanne, 2002).  
 
Table 2: Choice variables and policy parameters in MH models 
Paper  b  x  p or q  F  S  R 
Hart Latacz Lohmann(2005) 
Latacz Lohman (1998)  v  n.a.  v  p  p  n.a. 
Fraser (2001), (2002)  p  n.a.  p  p  n.a.  n.a. 
Fraser (2004)  p  n.a.  p  p  n.a.  n.a. 
Yano and Blandford (2009)*  p  n.a.  p  p  n.a.  p 
Choe and Fraser (1998)(1999)  p  n.a.  p  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Ozanne et al. (2001)  v  v  v  p  n.a.  n.a. 
White (2002)**  v  v  v  p  n.a  n.a. 
Ozanne and White 
(2007)(2008)  v  v  v  p  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: own elaboration. v= choice variable , p= policy parameter, n.a= not applicable. *A further parameter for 
these authors is the additional amount of fund for monitoring (T). ** The paper relies on input charges so x has to be 
interpreted as the unit input charge. 
 
2.6.  Policy prescriptions 
Some  key  results  can  be  identified  from  the  reviewed  literature  on  MH  in  agri-
environmental  policies.  A  general  finding  is  that  compliance  may  be  improved  by  policy 
settings  that  induce  higher  expected  losses  on  risk  neutral  non  compliers  (see  equation  1) 
leading to a trade-off between monitoring rates and fine levels. As the maximum fine level is 
usually constrained by legal or ethical considerations, the regulator must rely on more intense 
monitoring, an option that increases enforcement costs.  
Risk aversion can partially mitigate this problem. Ozanne et al. (2001) simulate agents 
with rising relative risk aversion and find that the higher the aversion to risk the better the 
approximation of the optimal solution under MH to the first best solution achievable under 
perfect monitoring or perfect information. Similarly, Fraser (2001,2002) suggests to use mean 
penalty preserving schemes that induce larger variance in income of non complying farmers. 
However,  as  long  as  such  schemes  are  characterized  by  larger  fines  coupled  with  lower 
monitoring intensity, they may conflict with the above mentioned constraints on penalty levels.  Ancona - 122
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If information about farmer risk aversion is scanty fine tuning of enforcement parameters 
may  be  difficult  to  achieve.  When  compliance  is  a  continuum  decision  and  fines  are 
proportional to over-quota input use, Ozanne and White (2007;2008) show that a variable fine 
leads to optimal contracts that are independent from farm risk preferences.  
In some contexts a single contract is offered to heterogeneous agents with differentiated 
compliance  costs.  In  this  case monitoring  efforts  should  be  targeted  to  farmer  with  higher 
compliance costs for whom the difference between expected payoffs under compliance and non 
compliance is lower. If the scheme allows for withdrawn of transfer payments in addition to 
fines  then  transfer  payments  can  substitute  fines  in  discouraging  non  compliance  in  a  cost 
effective way when monitoring is costly (Latacz Lohmann,1998).  
Also  incomplete  monitoring  raises  the  level of incentives  necessary  to  make  farmers 
comply with regulation. As a consequence regulators should set payment levels in accordance 
not only with cost of compliance but also with accuracy of monitoring (Choe and Fraser, 1998, 
1999). Incentive payments may be higher than compliance costs also in single agent continuum 
compliance models with fixed penalties such as the one by Ozanne et al. (2001). Choe and 
Fraser (1999) hint that overcompensation may be an issue in trade negotiation if payments in 
excess of compliance costs are treated as income support.  
Yuno and Blandford (2009) propose to resort to compliance rewards as alternative to 
higher transfer payments. However, the higher the reward the riskier the decision to comply. As 
a result, lower compliance rate among risk-averse farmers may be observed depending on the 
structure of enforcement costs. 
Targeting  is  a  well  know  issue  in  enforcement  studies  on  environmental  regulation 
(Heyes, 2000). Regulators should design schemes whereby farmers caught cheating are assigned 
to  target  groups  subjected  to  higher  monitoring.  Fraser  (2004)  shows  that  resource  neutral 
targeting can be achieved by lowering the monitoring pressure on non targeted groups. With 
risk  adverse  farmers  compliance  rate  are  maintained  at  the  previous  level  thanks  to  mean 
penalty preserving adjustments of fees and monitoring intensity. 
3.  EU CROSS-COMPLIANCE AND MH MODELS 
Latacz-Lohmann (1999) envisaged three main critical areas for the European CC policy: 
limited scope for spatial targeting, lack of fine tuning of incentives at farm level and information 
asymmetries that require appropriate enforcement. As far as enforcement is concerned, the same 
author argued that CC obligations would have been difficult to observe and monitor and a high 
degree of monitor would have been requested insofar as the envisaged sanctions were only a 
fraction of the single farm payment. 
Recent  evaluations  of  CC  (for  example  IEE  (2007)  and  ECA  (2008))  confirm  the 
relevance of the points raised by Latacz-Lohmann. However CC enforcement is likely to remain 
a key issue in the foreseeable future. Commission' communication on “The CAP towards 2020” 
(COM 2010/672) on the one hand envisaged a CC with “a simpler and more comprehensive set 
of  rules  without  watering down  the  concept of cross  compliance  itself”, on  the other hand Ancona - 122
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proposes to link a component of direct payment to non-contractual “environmental actions that 
go beyond cross-compliance and are linked to agriculture”.  
Current  enforcement  practices  of  CC  as  laid  down  by  Regulations  CE  73/2009  and 
1122/2009 are based on targeting and a system of stepwise variable sanctions. The sample for 
on site checks is at least 1% of all farmers submitting aid application. Monitored farmers are 
partly drawn at random and partly selected on the basis of risk analysis. In turn, risk analysis 
may be based -inter alia- on the type of statutory management requirements (SMR) or good 
agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC) for which the farm is eligible, size of direct 
payments and outcome of previous monitoring activities. 
Fines are calculated as reduction of direct payments differently in the case of neglicence 
or intentionality of non compliance. In the case of neglicence, a one shot infringement may lead 
to fines from 1% to %5 of direct payments depending on severity, extent and permanence of the 
infraction.  Repeated  non  compliance  in  following  periods  would  results  in  fines  up  to  a 
maximum of 15% of direct payments. Once the maximum fine is reached further infringements 
will be considered as intentional. In this and other cases of intentional non-compliance fines are 
higher ranging from 15% to 100% of the overall amount of direct payments with exclusion from 
the affected aid scheme in the following calendar year. 
Commission  Communication  147/2007  on  the  application  of  the  system  of  cross 
compliance points out that - in member States applying full cross-compliance- about 4.6 % of 
the eligible farmer were monitored in 2005 of which 16.4% were found non compliant. Non 
compliance mostly related to cattle registration, GAEC and Nitrate Directive. In Italy a recent 
study founds a non compliance rate of about 11% in 2007 ( MIPAAF, 2010). Overall, about 
95% of the fines were applied at the 5% level or lower, with more than two thirds applied at the 
1% level. 
Comparing the stylised features of CC enforcement in the EU and the main points raised 
by the reviewed literature we found only a partial overlapping of relevant themes. Most of the 
literature deals with static models whereas the sanctioning system of CC is a multiple-period 
one. The trade-off between sanctions and monitoring effort is not so relevant in a setting where 
direct payments are not related neither to environmental benefits not to enforcement strategies. 
Even if CC penalties are somewhat variable the continuum models proposed by the literature are 
only a rough approximation of the field practice. Whether the stepwise system of rising fines 
envisaged  by  the  EU  can  lower  the  impact  of  risk  aversion  on  compliance  decision  (as 
suggested by Ozanne and White, 2008) is an empirical issue.  
Evidence of low non-compliance rates coupled with low fines and low probability of 
detection supports the relevance of the paradox of compliance . Whether this pattern arises 
because of a large share of honest farmers (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005) or it is due to the 
state-dependent enforcement regime (Heyes, 2000) put in place by the EU is another question 
open for empirical research. Ancona - 122
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and 
identified  the  main  methodological  aspects  of  the  literature  on  this  topics.  Imperfect  vs 
incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main 
lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model.  
In a context where the level of the fines is legally constrained, higher rates of compliance 
can  be  achieved  by  improving  cost-effectiveness  of  monitoring  and  relying  on  farmer  risk 
aversion. However, how much farmer are risk averse is still an empirical (and debated) question 
and the observed high rates of compliance remain somewhat paradoxical. Either state dependent 
enforcement regimes or attitudes of farmers can help explain the empirical evidence. However, 
both themes have not been given appropriate emphasis in the MH models of agri-environmental 
schemes. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic MH 
models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour. 
We  want  to  conclude  by  commenting  on  the  problematic  relationship  between  MH 
models and empirical evidence in agri-environmental policies. Despite the formal elegance of 
these class of models their validation is often based only on numerical simulations. This in turn 
affect the relevance and direct applicability of the findings. To some extent the corresponding 
literature in the broader field of environmental regulation (Hey, 1996, 2000; Cohen, 1999) may 
provide  suggestions  for  the  development  of  models  more  conducive  to  empirical  tests. 
Similarly, stylisation of farmer behaviour in MH models may benefit from cross-fertilization 
with the wider literature on farmer attitudes towards and participation in agri-environmental 
schemes  (see  for  example:  Davies  and  Hodge,  2006;  Knowler  and  Bradshaw,  2007;  De 
Francesco et al., 2007). 
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